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Dominionism and Epistemology

I have decided to post the main piece of writing I've been working on this semester as a PDF.   It has been submitted to several Political Science journals and is awaiting peer review.  Below is the précis only followed by a downloadable  copy of the full document.  Enjoy:

Précis

Dominionism is an authoritarian ideology that combines political hegemony with metaphysical certitude.  A key impediment to any authoritarian leadership is the capacity of subjects to question and counter its claims to power.  Human reason and critical analysis provide the inspiration to subvert an authoritarian regime.   This paper examines an American political movement that works within the confines of liberal democracy to supplant liberal democracy.  Critical to its agenda is the undermining of institutions that cultivate reason in citizens.  The underlying difference in the conflict between dominionism and reason is best understood as a competition of epistemologies.

Download dominionism_and_epistemology.pdf

Posted by Gabriel Hudson on December 15, 2007 | Permalink | Comments (1)

Dramatis Personae

Recently in a discussion of the book American Fascists by Christ Hedges the topic was raised of whether the religious right constituted a fascist movement.  Topics included the challenge of effectively identifying fascism and who exactly counts as a member of the religious right.  I argue that the average religious fundamentalist family is primarily apolitical in their day-to-day life but that one can review the prevailing rhetoric of religious right interest groups and evaluate them in terms of their compatibility with the assumptions of liberal democracy.

Religious right groups typically depict themselves as desirous of a place at the table of public discourse.  And their rhetoric is usually phrased in terms of support or opposition to specific pieces of legislation.  To understand the religious right agenda one has to look deeper than reactions to singular legislation and focus instead on the underlying beliefs about the role of government.   This level of analysis is useful in deciphering whether the religious right is just a genre of interest group within liberal democracy or opponents to liberal democracy altogether. 

The religious right phrases their agenda in terms of individual issue positions.  But they do not actually advocate isolated policy preferences.  They advocate a different basis for law than is conventionally understood in a republican form of government.  They oppose pluralism in which different viewpoints compete equally for representation via elected representatives and issue advocacy.  Their central assumption is that their understanding of their religion should be the law of the land for everyone and those not adhering to their understanding of faith should be treated differently under the law. 

A good example of this is the contrast in response to two different expressions of faith.  In the case of Roy Moore they argued vehemently that Moore had the right to use government resources to display the Ten Commandments in the Alabama courthouse.  However, they also opposed the right of a Hindu minister to lead Congress in prayer.  Most religious right groups issued action alerts encouraging supporters to contact their members of Congress to prevent a prayer from another faith being read in Congress.  Protesters ultimately disrupted the Hindu prayer and the disruption was predictably praised throughout religious right web sites. 

This contrast shows their view of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.  Not only is the civil government – even the supposedly impartial judiciary - expected to express faith but only those adhering to the correct faith are afforded this right.  They advocate that members holding a specific interpretation of a specific religion be privileged while others are denied equal treatment under the law.  This surpasses mere issue advocacy and advocates a different style of government than liberal democracy.

A key tenet of liberal democracy is freedom of conscience – the right to believe what you choose.  This freedom is not based on an immutable characteristic like race.  People willfully choose their religious identity and can renounce their faith or convert to a different religious identity at anytime.  The freedom of conscience is based on individualized liberty.  One’s understanding of morals, religion, faith, their role in the universe and their relationship to a supreme being and each other is so core to identity that they are awarded special protection under the law.  That understanding of individual identity and the legal right to define one’s self and the confines of one’s life is key to other aspects of liberal democracy.  Central to freedom of conscience is the right of one citizen to reject the prescriptions of another citizen’s faith without legal repercussions.  Absent this understanding of personal autonomy no political system can derive other tenets such as private property rights or the rights of association and expression. 

The religious right gains a lot of attention in the media because they are the only reliable opponents to gay rights.  Unfortunately, the religious right has been successful in defining the discourse on gay rights in terms of support or opposition to homosexuality. The legal issue of gay rights really has very little to do with homosexuality.  One can vehemently oppose homosexuality based on personal religious convictions while still supporting equal treatment under the law regardless of religious convictions.  The issue of gay rights has to do with freedom of conscience.  By advocating that gay people should face legal discrimination because of a lack of adherence to their faith the religious right opposes absolute protection for freedom of conscience.  They currently gain the most yardage in their run to supplant individual liberty by adamantly opposing gay rights but the temporary target of their agenda is irrelevant in light of their overall vision of government.  There were other targets used in the past to argue against freedom of conscience and there will be new ones in the future when gay panic ceases to be lucrative. 

Leaders of religious right groups believe homosexuality is immoral.  They have every right to believe anything they want.  But they go beyond personal belief to advocate that people should be treated differently under the law based only on their expression of faith.  A good example of this is the opposition to the Employment Non-Discrimination Act.  ENDA, if passed and signed into law, would make it illegal to fire someone because of actual or perceived sexual orientation.  The only source of opposition to this bill is religious right groups.  They not only believe that homosexuality is wrong (a personal religious conviction) but that it should be legal to fire someone for not practicing their faith the way they prescribe. 

Morality based unequal treatment under the law is not sustainable legally due to the equal protection guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.  This realization is the reason religious rights groups invest so much interest in judicial appointments.  They code their support in terms of literalism or strict constructionist interpretations of the Constitution.  But their concept of constitutional application is so literal that it becomes useless in contemporary law.  Their advocacy is forced to then shift to opposition to judicial review altogether or an outright rejection of the rational basis test and the doctrine of stare decisis. 

In a liberal democracy members of the religious right are free to believe that certain things are immoral without fear of losing their job or facing discrimination in public accommodations.  Likewise, people should be free to choose not to adhere to precepts of others’ religious faith without the fear of legal discrimination.  The issue is not a minority religion or sexual orientation per se but the freedom of conscience to define one’s own moral parameters and governmental neutrality toward those personal parameters.

In order to have freedom of conscience and the formalized legal protections that derive from that freedom a government must be limited.  There must be certain aspects of an individual’s life that are so personal, so core to identity that they are outside of the coercive jurisdiction of the state.  The religious right advocates that the government invade that personal sphere and award certain individual liberties to the correct religious practice while denying those same liberties to other concepts of self.  From opposing the right of defendants to take an oath on the Koran to all legal protections for gay Americans the religious right forwards an understanding of government that is incompatible with liberal democracy. 

Public opinion on the issue of gay rights is quickly shifting.  In the near future faith-based moral opposition to equal rights will be an unpopular minority opinion.  Even when that demographic change occurs, freedom of conscience will protect the right of people to disapprove of homosexuality.  The religious right’s attack on the right of others to live out their beliefs undermines the protection for their own beliefs.  For this reason, the religious right is not merely anti-democratic but an irreducibly self-destructive movement that counters the understanding of freedom of conscience that makes their moral advocacy possible. 

The accurate label for the religious right remains elusive.  Some say they are a fascist movement.  Others stop at merely authoritarian.  I prefer the term “theocratic democracy” because I see a basic respect for the institutions of democracy in their rhetoric combined with religious criteria for full enfranchisement within those institutions.  Regardless of the label, even a precursory view of their advocacy reveals that they work within the confines of liberal democracy to establish a basis for law that is antithetical to liberal democracy.  The endgame is a theocratic caste system in which full individual liberties are awarded to the sufficiently pious whereas those deemed immoral or members of an inferior faith are treated differently under the law.   

Posted by Gabriel Hudson on December 13, 2007 | Permalink | Comments (0)

BOOK REVIEW: ISLAMIC POLITICAL ETHICS

Islamic Political Ethics, edited by Jack Miles, is not the work of a singular author but a collection of long form essays by various experts.  Although each portion can stand alone, all (except one) forward a general theme.  Islam contains a moral history of teachings in regards to establishing political power.  And, the interpretation of that history determines the degree to which an Islamic state can embrace modernity and principles of individual liberty. 

Jack Miles first sets the tone by encouraging an intellectual look at religion; all religion.  When specifically speaking of Muslims he encourages a greater community of Islam (umma) to do more to dispute the notion of war mongering fundamentalist zealots.  Then Sohail Hashmi develops that general sentiment in his preface by calling for a reexamination of Islam, a rejection of fundamentalism for “Islamism” and challenges Muslims globally to do a better job of disseminating Islamic ethics rather than the draconian hate unfortunately associated with Islam.

In Civil Society and Government in Islam, John Kelsay looks at Mohammed’s life and how his example contributes to participation in politics.  He asserts that within classical concepts of Islam there is a model for civil society and in more modern teachings on Islam this civil society is emphasized.  He balances the ulama against the khilafa that seems, even for a reader not familiar with much of the history, a conveniently selective use of Islamic traditions.  It is an elaborate way of making the very simple point that Islam does not preclude the possibility of civil society – even with the secularism the term ‘civil society’ implies. 

Farhad Kazemi in Perspectives builds on Kelsay’s work by drawing a bright distinction between backward fundamentalism and more intellectual Islam.  It is a theme repeated throughout proceeding essays.  Kazemi bemoans a latent intelligentsia within the Muslim community and proposes a resurgence of that community to fight the social ills of gender and minority oppression common under the dominance of less progressive approaches to religion.   Then in Conceptions, Hasan Hanafi develops this idea further by calling for a creative interpretation of Islamic texts to confront contemporary concepts of democracy.  His ideas are reformist and could be described as a correction of Islam.  According to Hanafi, civil society – even social contract democracy – is possible but an adjustment in the popular applications of the Qur’an must first be made.

In Boundaries, M. Raquibuz Zaman explores a type of Islamic ‘judicial review.’  The Islamic treatment of law is obviously more theocratic and absolute than Western civil and criminal jurisprudence.  Then in Maintenance, Sulayman Nyang discusses the role of religion in dictating the limits of human behavior not just for religious purposes but to maintain social order.  Both of these essays hint at but never provide a clear formula for the relationship between religion and law in a modern Arab state.  Religion is necessary to help find governable consensus and maintain social order but beyond that it is unclear how people will divorce explicit beliefs on the will God to live under the rule of law.

Then Eickelman argues that modern Islam actually provides for moral pluralism (what he labels ‘ethical pluralism.’).  He uses Islamic history to suggest a civil society that allows for pluralism.  His best example is Turkey – often cited as the most successful secular state with religious citizenry.  But, having already read Islamist Mobilization in Turkey by J. White, I know that even within that country there is an irrepressible wave of orthodox religiosity that threatens its secular institutions.  While Eickelman makes a good case that a civil society can be both Islamic and respect pluralism, he fails to answer how and how likely this will occur.

Masud’s follow up essay on pluralism develops this thesis further to suggest that tolerance from Pluralism does not need to be ‘interpreted’ in Islam but ‘recognized.’  Citing many sources in the long and winding history of Islam, Masud cast the religion as a moral tradition that is, by itself, pluralistic.  He also echoes previous calls for modernity and reformation in the form of reason.

Sohail Hashmi, the editor or the collection, parses the positive and negative effects of religion.  Religion, when used correctly, creates a ‘human habitat’ of commonality and goodwill.  Of course, religion can also be used to justify oppressive law and prevent social evolution that leads to the adoption of civil liberty protections.  His concern is how to root a legal code in Islamic morals but provide for dissent and protection of rights.

Then there’s Bassam Tibi’s piece on War and Peace in Islam.   This essay at the end reminds me of the children’s game where players are shown a grouping and asked which member doesn’t fit.  Tibi argues that at the core of Islam is an antiquated system that calls for violence against non-adherents.  He argues that Islam cannot be reformed, reinterpreted or reapplied to fit modern notions of democracy and tolerance because its nature is anti modernity.

The sad fact is, Tibi’s description of Islam as incompatible with intellectual or peaceful cultures is widely accepted today.  Many people view the Western ‘war on terror’ as a war on the religion of Islam.  The repeated message through the rest of the essays is that Islam in and of itself is not violent, hateful, misogynist, and archaic.  Miles’ call for an intelligent ‘theology’… Kazemi’s preference for lay intellectuals in Islam to challenge fundamentalism… and Masud’s pining for recognition of pluralism (among others) reflect a central thesis of this book and others read in the course.  Islam can be used to support systems that respect human rights and justice but only when interpreted with critical analysis and reason.  The war mongering Taliban representation of Islam does not represent all of Islam.  And the current image of the Muslim world as antithetical to modern democratic values is a product of history and politics and not any intrinsic deficiency in the religion. 

The essays in Islamic Political Ethics do a superb job of showing what’s possible for any group of people wanting to follow Islam but establish a just state with democratic principles.  It does not specify ‘how’ at a practical level.  Much of the work also misses the opportunity to make broader statements about the use of religion as an alternative to reason and rational thought.  In many ways, the harsh orthodoxy of Islamic fundamentalists mirrors Christian fundamentalists so influential in the United States today.  The same argument is that ‘true’ Christianity – when interpreted with reason and applied with critical thinking skills – supports democratic principles while the agenda of cultural hegemony forwarded by many Christians would result in a state not unlike the most oppressive in the Middle East.      

Broadening the analysis of Islam to a more universal criticism of how religion, any religion, can be used to affect politics would make statements about Muslims seem less like a criticism of any people and more a commentary on human nature.  The trappings of Islam and the promise of Islam are both there and it is contingent upon what is brought out that conversely, and unfortunately, defines the religion.   Neither another reformation of Islam or worldwide analysis of religion and political power (as a product of globalization) are out of the question.  The outcome depends on the intra-faith competition between reason and orthodoxy and the agenda setting power of leaders and believers.   

Posted by Gabriel Hudson on December 14, 2005 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

BOOK REVIEW: THE SEARCH FOR ARAB DEMOCRACY

In The Search for Arab Democracy, Larbi Sadiki presents a discursive look at religion and state power that reads like a lexicon of postmodern terms and theorists.  The work implicitly presents several popular, contemporary questions such as; “Is Democracy possible in traditionally Islamic states?”  “Can an Arab region have secular institutions with religious histories and persons?” Rather than argue a singular thesis to any of these questions, Sadiki explores the philosophical assumptions behind such inquiries.  Key to his approach is an exercise in linguistics.  While less concerned with the possibility of Democracy in an Islamic country, Sadiki instead asks what is meant by “democracy”, by “Islam”, and by “possible.”

Sadiki opens his one-man debate with an impressive explanation of foundationalism and anti-foundationalism.  He manages to adequately describe foundationalism and place in the lineage of Plato, Descartes, Kantian utilitarianism and Hart’s legal positivism while still being succinct.  Rejecting the stark and false dichotomy of absolutism vs. relativism, Sadiki introduces foundationalism as a critical tool to question so called ‘truths’.  At the heart of foundationalism is the idea of a central truth discoverable with reason and a concrete reality with some objective base.  The converse, antifoundationalism, suggests no such point from which to derive normative markers and measure meaning.  History is non-linear and denoted by shifting perceptions.   

Sadiki then puts his deconstruction method to work in practical form by looking at why foundationalism offers a poor starting point for evaluating democracy’s chances of success in an Arab state.  The foundationalist view of democracy seems to be rooted in a Western history.  By “Western”, Sadiki often implies “Christian.”  Much of the history that gave way to modern democratic institutions was birthed out of Christianity’s development.  The Protestant reformation spurred thoughts of social leveling and questioned a hegemonic divine order.  The resulting thought produced ingredients of Western democracy including individual autonomy, freedom of conscience, and expression.  The enlightenment moved much of the Western world from religious certitude to existential doubt.  Such landmarks along the path of Christian history have had little effect on the Muslim world.  But, in looking for signs of democracy in Islamic states, Sadiki suggests there may be equally significant parallels.  Key to finding these parallels is letting go of Occidentalist and Orientalist assumptions about government and religion. 

The conversion from a Western concept of democracy to progress elsewhere relies heavily on word choice and the translation from terms that denote Westernization to terms that preserve a unique Islamic character.  “Islamist” is preferred over “fundamentalist” because “fundamentalist” is a Western/Christian term with specific Catholic/Protestant connotations.  In the same way, many of the ideas that accompany democracy are evaluated under Muslim pretexts.  One example is social contract theory – often associated with Western democracy.  In the Western tradition of social contract theory there is an assumption of conformity among contractures.  Social contract theory was as much a factor in the forming of Western democracy as Christianity.  But the simultaneous introduction of the Protestant values of tolerance and pluralism can be seen to undermine some of the assumptions of social contract theory.  Yet, the question of whether Western or Christian states can be democratic is seldom asked.  A Muslim state, where religious conformity can often be assumed, may even be more conducive to developing its own civil society in the mode of a social contract.  By abandoning the occidentalist assumption that all things Western compliment all things Christian compliment all things democratic, Sadiki is able to show that some definition of Arab democracy can develop but it won’t grow just like its Western counterpart. 

Sadiki takes a hard look at the assumption that a state must be secular to be democratic.  The question is relevant.  However, where Sadiki first seems to falter is when he tries to selectively cite portions of the Qur’an.  Overall he presents the Qur’an as an infinitely plastic document whose texts can and have been used to support almost every position on the political spectrum.  Any reader can be assumed to be familiar with the oppression of women associated with Islamic regimes.  But, Sadiki uses the latter third of the book to show how Islam has been interpreted as a form of virocentric feminism.  By showing how differing interpretations of the Qur’an can lend to different political positions Sadiki shows that Islam, and all religion, can be constructed then construed in any number of ways.  So there is no one “Islam” but a myriad of interpretations, beliefs, practices that come from some concept of Islam or another.  And, some are more conducive to democracy than others. 

What the reader is left with is the postmodern idea that everything is a reducible construction.  Religion is a construct of a people just like government just like political values.  And democracy is possible in an Islamic state depending on what one means by “democracy” and what one means by “Islam.”  “Democracy” may develop in the Arab world but it is unlikely to be Western democracy.  Islam may catalyze democratic states but the teachings of Islam would first need to be democratized. 
Any definitive statement to close the book would contradict the reliance on antifoundationalism throughout.  So, Sadiki closes instead by encouraging a pluralistic dialogue.  This is a fitting end for a book that is less concerned with conclusions and more interested in how conclusions are found.    

Posted by Gabriel Hudson on December 14, 2005 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

READING GOOD

The good folks at BoingBoing.net (one of the best sites on the web) directed me to the homepage of PABBIS, Parents Against Bad Books In Schools.

The opening page to the site contains some gems.  Observe:

“Both in the classroom and library.”

That’s how the ‘sentence’ appears in the opening paragraph.  Note it’s not even close to a complete sentence.  In a listing of criteria under which a book might be considered “bad”, PABBIS provides this straightforward assessment:
“Is book relevant to curriculum, standards of learning, program of instruction?” and “What are educational goals/objectives and does book achieve them?”
I don’t know, is book?  Is “the” a swear word?  Does caveman like book if book good?    

The criteria are prefaced with the disclaimer:

“Bad is not for us to determine. Bad is what you determine is bad. Bad is what you think is bad for your child.”

My, how postmodern. 

The rest of the site may not have as many glaring errors as lack of articles and incomplete sentences but the syntax is simple and blunt and the complexity of presentation reads like a bad Native American stereotype in an old western.  I love it when an organization with which I disagree demonstrates my objections so clearly. 

There are many groups like this one popping up all over the country.  Book burning is all the rage these days.  Parents are demanding Harry Potter books be removed from school shelves.  Rep. Gerald Allen of Cottondale, Alabama wants to ban all books with homosexual content including The Color Purple and the complete works of Tennessee Williams and William Shakespeare.  His censorship ambitions don’t stop at school house libraries.  He wants books with references to “deviant lifestyles” banned in all public university libraries as well.  Similar “indecency” sites focusing on movies, television, and media employ the same formula.  Works are “reviewed” and a running tally is made of bad words and sexual references.  The tallies are then summed to create an overall score of ‘badness’ and the work is recommended for consumption or prohibition. 

I’m not a parent and if I were I probably wouldn’t want my grade school kid watching a lot of Comedy Central or Mtv.  But, what’s age appropriate for children is not of primary significance to these groups.  In counting dirty words and body parts, none of the reviewers concern themselves with the quality of the writing.  They never talk about the dimensionality of the characters or if the work proffers a compelling human story.  The ideal byproduct imagined by these groups is akin to the entertainment preferred by the suicidal wife in Fahrenheit 451.  In that fictional world all offensive material is banned and she enjoys watching clowns chase each other instead.  The silly and inconsequential are all that’s left.  To me, if a novel doesn’t make a bead of sweat glisten past the supple lips of a repressed housewife only to rest on her ample, heaving bosom, it probably isn’t that good of a read. 

The problem with censoring all offense is the loss of thought provocation.  Individuals, and derivatively society, benefit from presentations that offend the sensibilities.  It makes one a thinker.  All steps forward in mankind’s understanding of the world were shocking and controversial at first.  (Why did Galileo lose his head again?)   Related to that is the loss of purpose in books when reduced to lists of swear words and boobies.  Frankly, people that can’t appreciate literature for its literary merits end up being, well, illiterate.  One can assume those that work to ban books in public libraries haven’t read too many themselves.  Exhibit
A: “Is book relevant…?”

The American Library Association hosts an annual Banned Book Week when libraries across the country pull threatened pieces off their shelves and display them prominently.   The idea is to encourage readers to take a second look at something dismissed for ruffling the feathers of said repressed housewife.  But I think the reverse should occur.  I would rather the truly offensive, those that work to ban books, be put on display.  Thankfully, PABBIS has granted my wish with their web site.  Is site good?  Good is not for us to determine. Good is what you determine is good.

Posted by Gabriel Hudson on July 13, 2005 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

In Defense of Dumb

Last semester I took a course in statistics that became the hardest academic experience of my life.  I studied almost every day, hired a tutor, participated in study groups, and took flashcards with me everywhere I went to try to train my brain to compute the material.  On a lesser scale other classes were hard to grasp.  I often left class wondering if I was smart enough for the academic program I had chosen.  I felt so dumb and worried about having that feeling until this semester when a conversation with a professor changed my mind.  According to this guy, a pervasive sense of stupidity is one of the most advantageous qualities one can have as a student. 

I love/hate the Jaywalking segments on the Tonight Show.  They take a camera and ask regular people on the street questions for which everyone should know the answer.   Who was the first president?  How many days in a year?  What do we celebrate on Labor Day?  The humor comes from people not knowing the answers to common knowledge questions.   But, even when goaded by Jay, the people never think they’re dumb.  “Ugh, I’m a smart person, giggle giggle” says the busty blonde who doesn’t know the name of the first lady. 

Why was it significant that I felt dumb during my first semester of graduate school?  Because that feeling drives most intellectual pursuits.  A hunger for learning is an admission of inadequacy in your understanding of the world.  Realizing you’re just one dumb human counters the pride that keeps you from asking questions and challenging your own held ideas.  In order to be open to new ideas one has to suspend some of the confidence from previous learning and accommodate challenges to the brain.

I’m often hard on religious fundamentalists whether they be mullahs in the Middle East or evangelists here at home.  But, there are lots of ways to be a fundamentalist.  Fundamentalism is just mental rigidity – an irrational aversion to multiple ways of thinking.  Fundamentalism is really anti-critical thinking, anti-exploration, anti-innovation.  It’s over confidence in the belief that the way you see the world is the true and only way.  Open-mindedness is the simple humility of knowing you could be wrong.  The student of life recognizes the world of knowledge out there and feels fulfilled by reading and questioning it.  In essence, he feels dumb. 

Students that approach graduate school and people that approach life with an attitude that they’re already so learned end up not learning.  Without some awareness of personal ignorance there’s no reason to be inquisitive.  No matter how much you know or how much you don’t know you’ve got to be willing to let both go if you ever hope to know more.  So, feeling dumb has value only if it forces you to read and think.

I fundamentally believe that.   

Posted by Gabriel Hudson on February 15, 2005 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

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